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LOVELADIES HARBOR, INC. v. UNITED STATES:
THE CLAIMS COURT TAKES A WRONG
TURN-TOWARD A HIGHER
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The just compensation clause of the fifth amendment to the United States
Constitution prohibits the federal government from taking "private property
... for public use, without just compensation."' The principle goal of that
clause is to indemnify a property owner whose land is taken by the govern-
ment.2 A landowner's entitlement to compensation is warranted when a reg-
ulation effects a taking.3 Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has
not developed a clear test to determine when a regulation constitutes a tak-
ing.4 Rather, the Court evaluates each case according to its unique facts.'
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment is applicable to the states through the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166
U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
2. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (stating that the fifth amend-
ment "was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole"). For an excellent
discussion of the historical development of the just compensation clause, see Note, The Origins
and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE
L.J. 694 (1985).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958) (rec-
ognizing that "action in the form of regulation can so diminish the value of property as to
constitute a taking"); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922) (stating
that "if [a] regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking"); see also Michelman,
Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1625-29 (1988) (analyzing constitutional limitations
on land use regulations); Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights 81 YALE L.J. 149,
151-55 (1971) (same).
4. See Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles, Part I-A Cri-
tique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CALIF. L. REv. 1299, 1303 (1989). Professor
Peterson suggests that the Supreme Court has failed to establish a clear test to determine when
a taking occurs because the Court has not developed an explicit definition of property. Id at
1308-16. In Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978), for
example, the Supreme Court considered the "parcel as a whole" the relevant property. In
contrast, the Court in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 438 &
n.16 (1982), determined that a specific area of a building was the relevant property. Thus,
without a clear definition of property, determining when a taking of property occurs is difficult.
Peterson, supra, at 1308. Professor Peterson posits that subjective notions of fairness help to
explain when the Court will conclude that compensation is warranted. Id at 1305 n.13.
5. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
Catholic University Law Review
The Clean Water Act (Act), enacted in 1972 to safeguard the quality of
the Nation's waters,6 has recently generated takings litigation." Section 404
of the Act' grants the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) the authority to
regulate the amount of dredge or fill material discharged into the Nation's
navigable waters9 by issuing permits to control the discharge of dredge or fill
material.'° The term "navigable waters" includes wetlands." Thus, to de-
velop property classified as wetlands, a landowner must first seek the Corps'
approval. 12 The Corps then either issues a permit to the landowner permit-
6. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988)) (commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act).
The Clean Water Act's purpose is "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biologi-
cal integrity of the Nation's waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1251; see also United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 132-33 (1985) (indicating that the purpose of the Clean
Water Act is to protect the Nation's waters); 1902 Atlantic, Ltd. v. Hudson, 574 F. Supp.
1381, 1388 (E.D. Va. 1983) (same).
7. See, e.g., Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161, 175-76 (1990)
(holding that a denial of a fill permit under the Clean Water Act constitutes a taking); Lovela-
dies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 160-61 (1990) (same); Formanek v. United
States, 18 Cl. Ct. 785, 790-93 (1989) (finding ripe for review a landowner's claim that a denial
of a Clean Water Act permit effected a taking); Beur6-Co. v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 42, 49-52
(1988) (same).
8. 33 U.S.C. § 1344. See Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Alexander, 473 F. Supp. 525,
530-37 (W.D. La. 1979) (discussing § 404 of the Clean Water Act), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part sub nom. Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983). See
generally Blumm, The Clean Water Act's Section 404 Permit Program Enters Its Adolescence:
An Institutional and Programmatic Perspective, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 409 (1980) (addressing the
scope and early applications of § 404); Significant Development, The Clean Water Act-More
Section 404: The Supreme Court Gets Its Feet Wet, 65 B.U.L. REV. 995, 1012-18 (1985) (dis-
cussing the Corps' wetland regulations).
9. The Act defines navigable waters as "waters of the United States, including the terri-
torial seas." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1988). The Corps defines waters of the United States as all
waters which are capable of being used in interstate or foreign commerce, including wetlands.
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (1990).
10. 33 U.S.C. § 1344.
11. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (wetlands considered navigable waters); see also Save Our Wet-
lands, Inc. v. Sands, 711 F.2d 634, 647 (5th Cir. 1983) (same). The term wetlands is defined as
"those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and
duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence
of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands generally include
swamps, marshes, bogs and similar areas." 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b).
12. To secure a § 404 permit, an applicant must submit an application to a Corps district
engineer. 33 C.F.R. § 325.1(c) (1990). The applicant must provide a comprehensive descrip-
tion of the proposed development, "including necessary drawings, sketches, or plans.., the
location, purpose and need for the proposed activity; scheduling of the activity; the names and
addresses of adjoining property owners; ... and a list of authorizations required by the other
federal, interstate, state, or local agencies .... " Id. § 325.1(d); see also id. §§ 325.1(d)(2)-(9)
(specifying other information needed in a permit application). After the application is submit-
ted, the district engineer issues a notice soliciting comments. Id. § 325.2(a)(2). Subsequently,
the district engineer determines whether a permit should be issued. Id. § 325.2(a)(6). The
district engineer must balance the favorable and detrimental impacts of the proposed activity.
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ting him to fill the wetlands for development or refuses to issue a permit."3
Without a permit, landowners cannot develop wetland property. 4 Unable
to develop their property, many landowners complain that denial of a permit
constitutes a compensable taking.'5 Until recently, however, a landowner
unable to obtain a federal fill permit was not entitled to compensation under
the fifth amendment.' 6 The courts reasoned that a taking had not occurred
because the property owners were not deprived of all economic use of their
land. 7 In Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States,"8 the United States
Claims Court disregarded prior case law, and awarded compensation to a
builder who was denied a section 404 permit.' 9
Id. § 320.1(a). The district engineer then submits the determination to a higher official within
the Corps, who in turn decides whether a permit should be issued. Id § 325.2(aX6). Also, the
Corps must enforce Environmental Protection Agency regulations. See id. §§ 230-231 (Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency's guidelines); see also Formanek, 18 Cl. Ct. at 788-89 (discussing
regulations pertaining to fill permits).
13. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344; 33 C.F.R. § 323.3(a) (1990) (permit requirements); see also
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 123 (1985) (analyzing wetland
permit requirements).
14. See 33 C.F.R. § 323.3(a).
15. See infra note 16.
16. Under prior law, the denial of a federal fill permit was not considered a taking. Del-
tona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (holding that a denial of a fill permit
was not a taking because the landowner's property contained uplands which could be devel-
oped without a permit), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982); American Dredging Co. v. State
Dept. of Environmental Protection, 161 N.J. Super. 504, 391 A.2d 1265 (Ch. Div. 1978) (hold-
ing that a denial for a state wetland permit did not constitute a taking because the amount of
property effected by the denial was minimal), aff'd, 169 N.J. Super. 18, 404 A.2d 42 (App.
Div. 1979); Smithwick v. Alexander, 12 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,790 (E.D.N.C. Mar.
23, 1981) (holding that a permit denial did not constitute a taking because the property had
remaining economic value). But see Riverside Bayview Homes. 474 U.S. at 127 n.4 (announc-
ing in dictum that the denial of a fill permit would constitute a taking, if a landowner were
denied economically viable use of his property). Because Riverside Bayview Homes did not
introduce evidence bearing on whether it was denied economic use of its property, the Court
did not consider whether a taking occurred. Id at 129 n.6. See generally Significant Develop-
ment, supra note 8, at 997-1023 (analyzing the Supreme Court's holding in Riverside Bayview
Homes).
17. Deltona, 657 F.2d at 1191-94; Smithwick, 12 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,792; American
Dredgingr 161 N.J. Super. at 514, 391 A.2d at 1270-71.
18. 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990) (Loveladies).
19. Id. at 161. On the same day the Claims Court issued its opinion in Loveladies, the
Claims Court decided Florida Rock Indus, Inc. v. United States, 21 CI. Ct. 161, 175-76 (1990)
(holding that the denial of a fill permit constituted a taking). See infra note 219 (discussing the
court's holding in Florida Rock).
The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1988), grants the United States Court jurisdiction "to
render judgment upon any claim against the United States." Id. Further, the Tucker Act also
grants the Claims Court exclusive jurisdiction over suits against the United States where the
amount in controversy exceeds $10,000. Id. § 1491(aX). For claims not exceeding $10,000,
the Claims Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the district courts. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(a)(2) (1988); see also Burke v. United States, 5 Cl. Ct. 759, 760 (1984) (holding that
1991]
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In the late 1950's, two builders, Loveladies Harbor, Inc., and Loveladies
Harbor Unit D, Inc. (Loveladies), acquired 250 acres of undeveloped land
for $300,000 on Long Beach Island in New Jersey.2° Most of the property
was wetlands, which had to be filled before it could be developed.21
Before Loveladies developed the entire property, the New Jersey legisla-
ture adopted the Wetlands Act of 1970 (Wetlands Act).22 The Wetlands
Act requires an owner of wetlands to apply to the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection (DEP) for a permit prior to developing wet-
lands.23 Pursuant to the Wetlands Act, Loveladies applied for a permit to
fill and dredge approximately fifty-one acres of land to build 108 homes.24
DEP denied a wetland permit for the full fifty-one acres but offered Lovela-
dies an alternative permit authorizing development of twelve and one-half of
the fifty-one acres and construction of thirty-five houses.25 Loveladies ap-
pealed the decision to the Commissioner of DEP arguing that the denial of
because a district court does not have jurisdiction over claims against the United States for
more than $10,000, its decision was not binding). Thus, due to the Claims Court's exclusive
jurisdiction, it is particularly well suited to decide takings cases. See MarzuUa & Marzulla,
Regulatory Takings in the United States Claims Court: Adjusting the Burdens That in Fairness
and Equity Ought to be Borne by Society as a Whole, 40 CATH. U.L. REV. 549-50 (1990)
(stating that the Claims Court is well equipped to handle takings suits).
The Tucker Act, however, only grants the Claims Court jurisdiction over monetary claims
against the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491. The Claims Court does not have jurisdiction
under the Tucker Act to grant equitable relief. Lee v. Thornton, 420 U.S. 139, 140 (1975).
Thus, a landowner must seek declaratory relief in a district court and pursue separately a claim
for money damages in the Claims Court. Some commentators term this the "Tucker Act
Shuffle." Marzulla & Marzulla, supra, at 566 n. 108.
20. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 383 (1988) (Loveladies
Harbor).
21. Loveladies Harbor, 15 C. Ct. at 383. By 1972, approximately 199 acres of the prop-
erty had been dredged and filled for residential homes. Id.
22. Pub. L. No. 1970, ch. 272, § I (codified as amended at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:9A-1 to
A-10 (West 1979 & Supp. 1990)) (effective Nov. 4, 1970).
23. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:9A-4 (West Supp. 1990) (amending N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:9A-
4 (West 1979)). This statute states:
a. For purposes of this section "regulated activity" includes but is not limited to
draining, dredging, excavation or removal of soil, mud, sand, gravel, aggregate of any
kind or depositing or dumping therein any rubbish or similar material or discharging
therein liquid wastes ....
b. No regulated activity shall be conducted upon any wetland without a permit.
Id
24. Of these 51 acres, 36 were wetland and 15 were tideland. See In re Loveladies Harbor,
Inc., 176 N.J. Super. 69, 71, 422 A.2d 107, 108 (App. Div. 1980) (Loveladies Harbor, Inc.),
cert. denied, 85 N.J. 501, 427 A.2d 588 (1981).
25. Loveladies Harbor, 15 Cl. Ct. at 384. DEP also denied Loveladies' application for a
waterfront development permit because of the adverse effects the proposed construction would
have on the environment. The Appellate Division upheld the denial of that permit. See Love-
ladies Harbor, Inc., 176 N.J. Super. at 77, 422 A.2d at 11.
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the wetland permit constituted a taking.2 6 The Commissioner found that the
permit denial did not constitute a taking because DEP had suggested an
alternative proposal.27 Loveladies then appealed the decision to the Appel-
late Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey.28
Agreeing with DEP, the appellate court held that the denial of the wet-
land permit did not amount to a taking.29 The court reasoned that DEP's
proposed settlement enabled Loveladies to develop part of its property and,
therefore, a taking had not occurred.30 Thus, it was unnecessary to con-
sider, in the abstract, the validity of the Wetlands Act because the applica-
tion of that Act did not constitute a taking.3 I Accordingly, the court did not
consider whether a taking would have occurred had DEP not offered a
settlement.
In 1981, Loveladies applied for a permit consistent with DEP's develop-
ment proposal to fill twelve and one-half acres of its fifty-one acre tract.32
While DEP recognized that Loveladies' initial proposal to construct 108
houses did not satisfy pollution control requirements, 33 the agency neverthe-
26. Loveladies Harbor, 15 Cl. Ct. at 384.
27. Loveladies Harbor Inc., 176 N.J. Super. at 72, 422 A.2d at 108. The Commissioner
reasoned that the proposed construction did not satisfy the necessary statutory and regulatory
standards. Id.
28. See In re Loveladies Harbor, Inc., 176 N.J. Super. 69, 422 A.2d 107 (App. Div. 1980).
29. Id at 73, 422 A.2d at 109.
30. Id This is one of the first instances in the history of Claims Court decisions where the
court suggested that the dredging or filling of wetlands was a public nuisance. The Claiims
Court based its decision on Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978),
and American Dredging, 161 N.J. Super. 504, 391 A.2d 1265 (Ch. Div. 1978), aff'd, 169 N.J.
Super. 18, 404 A.2d 42 (App. Div. 1979). The Appellate Division, however, could have held
that dredging and filling falls within the public nuisance exception to the fifth amendment just
compensation clause, as enunciated in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). See infra note
78 (discussing the public nuisance exception).
31. Loveladies Harbor, Inc., 176 N.J. Super at 73, 422 A.2d at 109.
32. 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 384 (1988).
33. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, ch. 7A (Supp. 1988). To mitigate the effects of pollu-
tion, state law imposes stringent controls on wetlands development. For example, section 7:7-
2.2 provides:
(a) Wetlands permits are required for almost all activities in coastal wetlands
delineated and mapped pursuant to the Wetlands Act, and are divided into two
categories:
1. Type "A" Wetland permits are required for:
i. The cultivation and harvesting of naturally occurring agricultural
products....
iii. The maintenance or repair of bridges, roads, highways, railroad
beds or the facilities of any utility or municipality .... ;
iv. The construction of catwalks, piers, docks, landings, footbridges
and observation decks.
1991]
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less approved the application, believing that its original settlement offer was
binding.34 DEP, however, did not give permission to Loveladies to develop
the full twelve and one-half acres. Instead, DEP granted a permit for eleven
and one-half acres, finding that one acre qualified as uplands and had al-
ready been filled. 35 After obtaining the state permit, Loveladies sought a
federal permit from the Corps under the Clean Water Act.36 On May 5,
1982, the Corps denied the permit because of the negative effects the pro-
posed housing construction would have on the environment.37
After unsuccessfully challenging the validity of the permit denial in the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey,3" Loveladies
filed suit in the United States Claims Court.39 Loveladies alleged that the
denial of the permit was an unconstitutional taking of the twelve and one-
half acres of property that could not be developed.' Under the theory of
inverse condemnation,4 Loveladies sought compensation for the value of
the eleven and one-half acres of wetlands as well as for the one acre of up-
land that otherwise could have been developed.42
The government then moved for summary judgment maintaining that, as
a matter of law, a taking had not occurred.43 In response, Loveladies filed a
cross-motion for summary judgment, reiterating its claim that the permit
denial constituted a taking.' The United States Claims Court denied the
government's motion.4" To evaluate the merits of the government's motion,
the court balanced the public factors underlying the denial of the fill permit
2. Type "B" Wetland permits are required for:
i. The installation of utilities;
viii. Filling, excavation or the construction of any structure.
Id § 7:7-2.2.
34. Loveladies Harbor, 15 Cl. Ct. at 384.
35. Id.
36. Id.; see 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376.
37. Loveladies Harbor, 15 Cl. Ct. at 384. The specific reason for denying the permit "was
the government's desire to preserve the wetlands along with its attendant wildlife and vegeta-
tion." Id. The Claims Court stated that the pollution in Loveladies Harbor was not harmful
because it was "a kind merely incidental to any human action undertaken," but did not state
why it reached that conclusion. Id at 389. However, it is not the court's role to determine the
effects of pollution-that is a responsibility of the Corps. See 33 U.S.C. § 1254.
38. See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. Baldwin, No. 82-1948 (D.N.J. Mar. 12, 1984) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file), aff'd merm, 751 F.2d 376 (3d Cir. 1984).
39. Loveladies Harbor, 15 Cl. Ct. 381 (1988).
40. Id. at 383.
41. See infra note 66 (defining inverse condemnation).
42. Loveladies Harbor, 15 Cl. Ct. at 384.
43. Id. at 383.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 393-96.
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against the ensuing economic harm to the landowners resulting from the
denial of the permit.' The court struck the balance in favor of Loveladies,
finding that there was a lack of a legitimate state interest underlying the
denial of the wetland permit.47 The court also found that the denial of the
permit lowered the value of Loveladies' property.4 The Claims Court, how-
ever, did not award compensation to Loveladies and denied its cross-motion
for summary judgment, reasoning that there were factual issues in dispute
concerning the remaining uses of Loveladies' property.49
Nearly two years later, after a trial on the merits of the takings claim, the
Claims Court held that the denial of the fill permit constituted a taking.
50
After comparing the preregulation value of the wetlands to their postregula-
tion value,51 the court concluded that Loveladies was denied virtually all
economic use of its property because the Corps refusal to issue the permit
hampered Loveladies' attempts to develop its land.52 The Claims Court also
based its decision on an earlier finding that the permit denial did not sub-
stantially advance a legitimate state interest.
5 3
The Claims Court's balance of public and private factors to determine
whether the permit denial advanced a legitimate state interest54 entails a
higher standard of review for takings claims than prior case law. In the
wake of Loveladies, land use regulations will receive closer scrutiny. Regula-
tors will have to meet a higher burden to demonstrate that a regulation of
46. Id. at 388-89. The Claims Court stated:
The determination of whether there is a substantial advancement of a legitimate
governmental interest necessarily requires that the governmental regulation was in-
tended to promote the public welfare, rather than some private interest. However,
the mere fact that the governmental regulation was intended to promote a public
benefit is not sufficient to satisfy the test. This determination must also involve the
court's weighing of that intended public benefit against the harm inflicted upon the
landowner involved.
Id. at 388 (citations omitted).
47. Id. at 389-90.
48. Id. at 393-96.
49. Id. at 396-98; see also id. at 397 n. 14 ("Defendant initially accepted plaintiffs' post-
denial estimation of the land's value and use. Defendant then changed its position a few days
before oral argument and introduced two affidavits indicating that the land was left with much
greater potential.") (citing Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 375 (1988)).
50. Loveladies, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 160 (1990).
51. Id. at 155-59.
52. Id. at 160. Accordingly, the plaintiffs were awarded nearly $3,000,000 in compensa-
tion. Id. at 161.
53. Id. at 161.
54. Loveladies Harbor, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 388-89 (1988).
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privately owned land is not tantamount to a taking. As a result, Loveladies
will probably generate an influx of takings litigation in the Claims Court.
55
This Note analyzes the court's holding in Loveladies, focusing upon the
standard of review which the court created. The author begins with an ex-
amination of the Supreme Court's approach to regulatory takings. Next, the
author compares the Loveladies opinion with the Supreme Court's takings
doctrine and suggests that the Claims Court implicitly prescribed a higher
standard of review. This Note concludes that the result reached in Lovela-
dies was proper because it is consistent with the fairness concerns underlying
the fifth amendment. Nonetheless, the court's reasoning stood on analyti-
cally weak ground and misapplied Supreme Court precedent.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS OF TAKINGS
When a regulation significantly interferes with a landowner's use and en-
joyment of his property, the fifth amendment mandates compensation.
5 6
55. From January 1, 1989, to September 30, 1990, the Claims Court decided 34 takings
cases. See UNITED STATES CLAIMS COURT, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT (1991). The court
awarded compensation in only six cases, but damages totalled approximately $91,000,000. Id.
As a result of the higher level of scrutiny the Claims Court adopted, landowners subject to
land use regulations are more likely challenge the government's regulations and win. In 1988,
however, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12,630 (Order), entitled, "Governmental
Actions and Interferences with Constitutionally Protected Property Rights." Exec. Order No.
12,630, 3 C.F.R. 554 (1990). The Order directs administrative agencies to conduct a pre-
issuance review to determine whether a regulation or policy constitutes a taking. Id. One
reason that President Reagan issued the Order was to ensure that agencies comply with the
Supreme Court's holdings in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Ange-
les, 482 U.S. 304, 310 (1987) (holding that money damages are the appropriate remedy for
temporary regulatory takings) and Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987)
(requiring a close nexus between a regulation and the purposes underlying it). See 3 C.F.R.
554. As a result of the Order, there may be a decrease in takings suits because the Order
should force agencies to consider specifically the possibility that a regulation will work a tak-
ing. Nevertheless, issuance of the Order is no guarantee that agencies will comply with it. See
Steinberg, Can EPA Sue Other Federal Agencies?, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 317, 329 n.80 (1990)
(noting that "there may be circumstances in which agencies fail or refuse to comply with...
Executive orders"). Thus, notwithstanding the Order, Loveladies will probably increase tak-
ings litigation in the Claims Court. See generally Marzulla & Marzulla, supra note 19, at 566-
69 (discussing Executive Order 12,630); W.L. WANT, LAW OF WETLANDS REGULATION
§ 10.07 (1989) (same).
56. U.S. CONST. amend V. As an alternative to the fifth amendment, the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment may also provide a landowner limited protection against
an intrusive government regulation. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). In Mugler,
Mugler was arrested, pursuant to a Kansas statute, for selling alcohol without a license.
Mugler maintained that the statute was invalid because it contravened the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, maintaining that
the statute was "fairly adapted to the end of protecting the community against the evils which
confessedly result from the excessive use of ardent spirits." Id. at 662. The Mugler majority
did not consider the impact of the regulation on the property owner. Cf Pennsylvania Coal
[Vol. 40:753
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The amendment requires the government to indemnify a landowner where a
regulation effects a taking of his property. Thus, the compensation prevents
a landowner from shouldering costs, which in fairness, society should bear."
The United States Supreme Court, however, has been unable to develop a
clear test to determine when a regulation gives rise to a taking."8 According
to the Court, the only generally accepted precept of takings law is that each
case involves an ad hoc inquiry into the specific facts of the case.5 9
Where a regulation negatively affects a landowner's property, the land-
owner can attack either the application of the state action or its facial valid-
ity. 6° The standards the Supreme Court has enunciated in takings cases,
however, do not distinguish facial and "as applied" challenges.6 ' Instead,
the Court has applied three tests to determine whether a regulation consti-
tutes a taking. Under one test, the Court balances a property owner's invest-
ment-backed expectations, the economic impact of a regulation, and the
character of the governmental action to decide whether a regulation has
worked a taking.62 Another test examines whether a regulation either sub-
stantially advances a legitimate state interest or denies a property owner eco-
nomically viable use of the property.63 Still a third test holds that a taking
occurs where state action results in a permanent physical invasion of a land-
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); see infra notes 66-83 and accompanying text. Rather, the
Court engaged in a substantive due process analysis where it analyzed the statute's efficacy.
Under that analysis, the Court examined the extent to which the statute achieved its objectives.
See Lawrence, Means, Motives, and Takings: The Nexus Test of Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission, 12 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 231, 233-35 (1988) (suggesting that "the Mugler
approach threatened to read the takings clause out of the Constitution" because the Court did
not consider the negative effects of the regulation on the value of the landowner's property).
57. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); see Note, supra note 2, at 708-16
(describing the development of the just compensation clause); see also infra note 65 and accom-
panying text (suggesting that principles of fairness underly the fifth amendment).
58. See supra note 4.
59. See, e.g., Connolly v. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224 (1986) (stating that
the Court has not developed a clear test to determine when a regulation effects a taking, in-
stead the Court relies on ad hoc factual inquiries); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recla-
mation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 295 (1981) (same); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164,
174-75 (1979) (same).
60. See Peterson, supra note 4, at 1360 (discussing facial and "as applied" challenges).
Compare Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) ("as applied" chal-
lenge) with Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (facial challenge). See also Hodel,
452 U.S. at 295-96 (stating that the economic viability test of Agins applies in a facial challenge
to a law, whereas the three part Penn Central test applies in an "as applied" challenge).
61. Peterson, supra note 4, at 1360.
62. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124; see also infra text accompanying notes 84-114
(discussing the Court's holding in Penn Central).
63. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 260; see also infra text accompanying notes 116-31 (discussing
the Court's decision in Agins).
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owner's property.M Unfortunately, it is unclear which test the Court will
apply to evaluate a takings claim. Nevertheless, principles of fairness appear
to be at the heart of the Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence.6 5
A. A Deferential Standard of Review
1. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon: The Reduction In Value Test
Under the doctrine of inverse condemnation,66 a landowner is entitled to
compensation when a regulation affecting his property is overly intrusive.67
The genesis of this doctrine is traced to the landmark case of Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon.68 In Pennsylvania Coal, Mahon unsuccessfully brought
a suit in equity to enjoin the Pennsylvania Coal Co. (Pennsylvania Coal)
from mining coal near his property.69 Mahon alleged that the mining would
64. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); see also
infra note 99 (discussing the Court's holding in Loretto).
65. For example, in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), the Court
stated that:
[T"he Fifth Amendment "prevents the public from loading upon one individual more
than his just share of the burdens of government, and says that when he surrenders to
the public something more and different from that which is exacted from other mem-
bers of the public, a full and just equivalent shall be returned to him."
Id. at 83 n.7 (citing Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893));
see also Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (stating that the Court has not developed a clear test
"for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public
action be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated
on a few persons"); see Peterson, supra note 4, at 1306 ("After all, the ultimate question in
every takings case... is whether fairness requires that the burden be borne by the public as a
whole, rather than by the particular claimant."); Comment, Just Compensation or Just Dam-
ages:" The Measure of Damages for Temporary Regulatory Takings in Wheeler v. City of Pleas-
ant Grove, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1243, 1258 (1989) (observing that "[a] primary purpose of the
fifth amendment's just compensation clause is to distribute losses when the government appro-
priates private property for public use" and that courts follow "a principle of fairness in pro-
moting this purpose") (footnotes omitted).
66. Inverse condemnation is a "shorthand description of the manner in which a land-
owner recovers just compensation for a taking of his property when condemnation proceedings
have not been instituted." United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980); see San Diego
Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 638 n.2 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(inverse condemnation is "a cause of action against a government defendant in which a land-
owner may recover just compensation for a 'taking' of his property under the Fifth Amend-
ment, even though formal condemnation proceedings .. .have not been instituted"). See
generally 7A P. ROHAN & M. RESKING, NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 14.03
(3d ed. 1990) (defining inverse condemnation as a suit brought by a landowner challenging a
regulation that negatively affects the value of his property).
67. A plaintiff usually bases an inverse condemnation claim upon the just compensation
clause of the fifth amendment. See San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 638 n.2.
68. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See generally Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings
Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984) (analyzing the parameters of the Penn-
sylvania Coal decision).
69. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 412.
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cause the subsidence of his house."° He relied on a Pennsylvania statute,71
which prohibited mining coal when its removal would cause the subsidence
of houses and related structures near the mines. 72 Pennsylvania Coal coun-
tered that the statute was unconstitutional because it effected a taking of its
property, the unmined coal, without just compensation. 3
To determine whether the statute constituted a taking, the Supreme Court
balanced the extent to which Pennsylvania Coal's property diminished in
value as a result of the statute against the purposes underlying the regula-
tion.74 Writing for the majority, Justice Holmes conceded that preventing
subsidence was a valid public purpose.75 He noted, however, that the public
interest the statute furthered was minimal. 76 Nevertheless, the Court held
that the statute resulted in a taking because it significantly reduced the value
of Pennsylvania Coal's property. Accordingly, to demonstrate a taking
70. Id.
71. The Kohler Act, 1921 Pa. Laws 1198.
72. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 412.
73. Id at 395 (Argument for Plaintiff in Error).
74. Id at 413. Prior to Pennsylvania Coal, land use regulations were usually challenged
on the basis of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123
U.S. 623 (1887); see supra note 56 (discussing Mugler); see also Lawrence, supra note 56, at 235
(suggesting that the Pennsylvania Coal Court abandoned the Mugler approach because Mugler
"gave no weight to a regulation's impact on property owners").
75. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 416. The majority opinion stated: "We assume...
that the statute was passed upon the conviction that an exigency existed that would warrant it,
and we assume that an exigency exists that would warrant the exercise of eminent domain."
Id
76. Id. at 413-14. Specifically, Justice Holmes stated: "The extent of the public interest is
shown by the statute to be limited, since the statute ordinarily does not apply to land when the
surface is owned by the owner of the coal. Furthermore, it is not justified as a protection of
personal safety." Id.
77. Id. at 415-16. Justice Holmes reasoned that "[w]hile property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Id. at 415. In
dissent, Justice Brandeis argued that a regulation that prohibits a noxious use of property does
not constitute a taking. Id at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis further argued
that the Court should have deferred to the legislature's determination that the statute was
necessary to promote public safety. Id. at 416-22.
Cf United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (expounding upon the reduction in value
test developed in Pennsylvania Coal). The plaintiff in Causby owned a chicken farm which was
located adjacent to an airport leased by the United States. Id. at 258. Noise generated by low
flying aircraft forced the plaintiff to discontinue his business. Id. at 259. Consequently,
Causby sued the United States alleging that the flights constituted an easement. Id at 258.
As in Pennsylvania Coal, the Supreme Court ruled that a taking had occurred because the
flights rendered useless the plaintiff's property. Iat at 261-62. In addition to examining the
diminution in value, the Court analyzed the "character" of the government's action. The
Court declared that "it is the character of the invasion, not the amount of damage resulting
from it, so long as the damage is substantial, that determines the question whether it is a
taking." Id. at 266 (quoting United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917)).
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under the Pennsylvania Coal reduction in value test, a landowner must show
that a regulation severely diminishes the value of the property.78 The extent
the property must diminish in value to rise to the level of a taking is unclear,
however.79
The Pennsylvania Coal Court scrutinized the objectives of the regulation,
and, thus, employed a standard for reviewing the state action that was not
deferential."0 By balancing the public purposes underlying the regulation
against the economic harm to the landowner, the Court substituted its view
78. Justice Holmes also observed that the mining of coal caused the subsidence of only
one house and, therefore, did not constitute a public nuisance. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at
413. Under prior case law, statutes prohibiting property owners from conducting activities
found to be public nuisances were upheld and, thus, did not warrant compensation. See
Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668 ("[a] prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are
declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community,
cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public
benefit"). This exemption from compensation is termed the noxious use or public nuisance
exception to the fifth amendment. The result reached in Pennsylvania Coal may have been
different if the mining of coal rose to the level of a public nuisance. See generally Comment,
Reexamining 100 Years of Supreme Court Regulatory Taking Doctrine: The Principles of
"Noxious Use," "Average Reciprocity of Advantage, "and "Bundle of Rights" From Mugler to
Keystone Bituminous Coal, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 653, 658-66 (1987) (providing an
excellent overview of the noxious use exception).
79. See Rose, supra note 68, at 566 (stating that the Pennsylvania Coal reduction in value
test "fails to answer the most obvious question: how much diminution in value is too much?");
Recent Cases, 36 HARV. L. REV. 753, 753 (1923) (to what degree property must diminish in
value to constitute a taking is unclear). See generally Clarke, Regulatory Takings, Laissez
Faire and Two Coal Cases From Pennsylvania, 13 OKLA. CrrY U.L. REV. 37, 77 (suggesting
that Pennsylvania Coal "really holds that state reduction of the profits of one group of property
owners to a reasonable level to ensure the economic welfare of another group or the entire
public is ordinarily not a legitimate objective of the police power").
A regulation furthering the public interest promotes "the health, morals and safety of the
people." See Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668-69. Cases after Pennsylvania Coal, upheld regulations
that served the public interest, regardless of the extent to which the value of a landowner's
property declined. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 595-96 (1962)
(holding that a zoning ordinance which prohibited a property owner from mining sand and
gravel due to safety concerns did not constitute a taking); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 280
(1928) (holding that a law requiring a property owner to cut down red cedar trees to prevent
harm to apple trees was not a taking); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,
395-96 (1926) (holding that a zoning law that reduced the value of a landowner's property by
nearly 76% was not a taking because the law furthered the public interest). But cf Nectow v.
City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188-89 (1928) (holding that zoning ordinances severely di-
minishing the value of a landowner's property effected a taking).
80. Pennsylvania Coal. 260 U.S. at 412-13. Justice Holmes stated that "[t]he greatest
weight [should be] given to the judgment of the legislature, but it always is open to interested
parties to contend that the legislature had gone beyond its constitutional power." Id at 413.
Nevertheless, the Court did not defer to the legislature's determination that the statute pro-
moted public safety. Instead, the Court reasoned that providing notice to the affected parties
could have ensured personal safety. Id. at 414.
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of the regulation for the view of the Pennsylvania Legislature.81 That mode
of analysis entangles the judiciary in second-guessing legislative determina-
tions.8 2 The substitution of judgment approach was struck down in later
cases in favor of a deferential standard of review.8 3
2. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City: The Three
Part Test
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 4 the Supreme
Court supplemented the Pennsylvania Coal diminution in value test to con-
sider whether a state action is a taking. The Penn Central Transportation
Co. (Penn Central) challenged the application of New York City's
Landmarks Preservation Law (Landmarks Preservation Law),85 alleging
that it violated the fifth and fourteenth amendments.8 6 The law granted the
Landmarks Preservation Commission (Commission) the authority to desig-
nate certain buildings in the city as landmarks.8 7 If a building were a listed
landmark, the law required the landowner to obtain a permit from the Com-
mission before making any structural changes to the building.88 In 1967, the
Commission earmarked Grand Central Terminal as a landmark. 9 Pursuant
to the Landmarks Preservation Law, Penn Central applied for a permit to
construct office buildings over Grand Central Terminal. 9' The Commission
81. Lawrence, supra note 56, at 236.
82. Id.
83. See infra text accompanying notes 132-36.
84. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
85. Id at 109 (New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law (Landmarks Preservation
Law) is currently codified at NEW YORK CITY, ADMIN. CODE ch. 3 (1986)). The Court noted
that this regulation
foster[s] "civic pride in the beauty and noble accomplishments of the past"; protect[s]
and enhance[s] "the city's attractions to tourists and visitors"; "support[s] and stimu-
late[s] business and industry"; "strengthen[s] the economy of the city"; and pro-
mote[s] "the use of historic districts, landmarks, interior landmarks and scenic
landmarks for the education, pleasure and welfare of the people of the city."
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 109.
86. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 119.
87. See Landmarks Preservation Law, supra note 85. See generally Rankin, Operation
and Interpretation of the New York City Landmarks Preservation Law, 36 LAw & CONTEMP.
PRO~s. 366, 366-68 (1971) (discussing the application of the Preservation Law).
88. See supra note 85. The Landmarks Preservation Law requires landowners to keep the
exterior of their buildings in good repair. Id.
89. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 115-16.
90. Id. at 116-17. Penn Central actually submitted two proposals to the Landmarks Pres-
ervation Commission (Commission). The first proposal entailed constructing a 55-story office
building on the roof of Grand Central Terminal. Id at 116. The second proposal entailed
tearing down a portion of the existing building to construct a 53-story office building. Id at
116-17.
1991]
Catholic University Law Review
denied Penn Central's application.9" As a result, Penn Central sought com-
pensation under the fifth and fourteenth amendments, maintaining that its
loss of the development rights above Grand Central Terminal effected a
taking.
92
In Penn Central, the Supreme Court acknowledged that neither the Con-
stitution nor prior precedent provided a formula to determine when a regula-
tion amounts to a taking.9 3 Rather, the Court determined that the facts of
each case must be assessed.94 The Court, however, identified three factors
from its survey of prior cases to determine whether a taking had occurred.9"
First, the Court noted that the "economic impact of a regulation" on a prop-
erty owner should be measured.96 If the regulation impairs the economic
viability of the property, as opposed to merely diminishing its value, the
Court will probably conclude that the regulation constitutes a taking.97 Sec-
ond, the Court stated that the degree to which the regulation interferes with
an owner's "investment-backed expectations" should be determined. 9
91. Id. at 117. The Commission denied both proposals, desiring to preserve the historical
architecture of the Grand Central Terminal. Id. at 117-18.
92. Id. at 119.
93. Id. at 123-24.
94. Id. at 124 (citing United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168
(1958)). See B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 236 n.9 (1977)
(stating that courts have "proceeded immediately to a particularistic weighing-up of factors
whose character and weight are never clearly assessed").
95. Penn Central 438 U.S. at 124. The Court cited Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369
U.S. 590, 594 (1962) (in which the Court considered the economic impact of a regulation as
well as the degree to which the regulation interfered with the property owner's investment
expectations to ascertain whether a taking occurred) and United States v. Causby, 328 U.S.
256 (1946) (in which the Court considered the character of the governmental action to analyze
the takings issue).
96. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. See generally Peterson, supra note 4, at 1325-27 (ana-
lyzing the economic impact prong of the Penn Central test); Peterson, Land Use Regulatory
"Takings" Revisited: The New Supreme Court Approaches, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 335, 340-45
(1988) (same). Under that factor, compensation may not be compelled even if a regulation
prohibits the most profitable use of property. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 64-65 (1979)
(holding that every regulation which may affect the value of private property does not consti-
tute a taking because that would require the government to pay compensation for the effects of
every regulation).
In comparison, the Supreme Court in Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987), held that a
federal statute that prohibited both devise and descent, but allowed inter vivos transfer, of
certain property effected a taking. Id. at 717. While the Court did not expressly overrule
Andrus, it held that a partial diminution in value may constitute a taking. Id. In dissent,
Justice Scalia argued that Irving effectively limited Andrus to its facts. Id. at 719 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). But see id. at 718 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority's opinion
would not limit Andrus to its facts).
97. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
98. Id. at 124.
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Third, the Court indicated that the character of a governmental action
should be considered. 99
The Court first addressed the character of the governmental action."
Explaining that factor, the Court stated that if the regulation were a physical
invasion rather than a public program that intangibly interferes with the
property,' 0 ' then the Court may find the regulation to be a taking.' °2 By
contrast, if the law interferes with a landowner's property, but otherwise
furthers a broader common good,' 3 then the law would probably not be a
taking. 1" Yet, after describing the character of the governmental action
prong, the Court failed to consider that factor when determining whether
the application of the law effected a taking.
Next, the Court considered the economic impact of the regulation, partic-
ularly the extent to which it interfered with Penn Central's investment-
backed expectations. The Court reasoned that if the impact of the regulation
severely interfered with the owner's use of the property, then the action was
a taking for which the fifth and fourteenth amendments required compensa-
tion." 5 Although the regulation in Penn Central denied the owner of the
Grand Central Terminal the most profitable use of its property, the Court
found that the New York City law did not deprive Penn Central of all eco-
99. Id.; accord Connolly v. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224-25 (1986) (de-
lineating the three Penn Central factors as the appropriate test for a regulatory taking).
In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp, 458 U.S. 419 (1982), the Supreme
Court, relying on the character of the governmental action prong of the Penn Central test,
fashioned aperse test to determine whether a taking occurred. Id. at 441. The Supreme Court
held that "a permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a taking without
regard to the public interest it may serve." Id at 426. See generally Hall v. City of Santa
Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying the Loretto physical invasion rule), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 940 (1988).
100. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
101. The appropriate inquiry to determine whether a regulation interferes with an owner's
property is whether the regulation frustrates an owner's current use of property. The Court
stated that "the New York City law does not interfere in any way with the present uses of the
Terminal." Id. at 136. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the Landmarks Preservation
Law did "not interfere with what must be regarded as Penn Central's primary expectation
concerning the use of the parcel." Id.
102. Id. at 124.
103. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (upholding a law that required a
property owner to cut down ornamental red cedar trees because of harm they caused to neigh-
boring apple trees); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding a
zoning law that prohibited an industrial use of property). But cf Nectow v. City of Cam-
bridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (striking down a zoning ordinance found to be intrusive). Thus, it
appears the character of the governmental action test is similar to the public nuisance excep-
tion. See supra note 78 (discussing the public nuisance exception).
104. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
105. Id. at 136-37.
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nomic use of the property."o Because the law did not completely eliminate
Penn Central's economic use of the Terminal, the Court concluded that the
extent of interference did not impinge on Penn Central's reasonable invest-
ment expectations.' 0 7 Therefore, the impact was not so severe as to require
compensation.'0° The Court's opinion is unclear, however, regarding the
weight to give to the three factors. "o9 Later cases have attempted to flesh out
the importance of each factor but have reached inconsistent results. " 0
Despite the Supreme Court's use of a balancing test to determine whether
the Landmarks Preservation Law constituted a taking, the Court sanctioned
a deferential standard of review by accepting the legislature's determination
that the law furthered a substantial public purpose."' Notably, the Court
pointed out that "a use restriction on real property may constitute a 'taking'
if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public pur-
pose." ' 12 Accordingly, the Supreme Court did not require a close correla-
106. Id A judicial balancing test, such as the three part test espoused in Penn Central
sometimes leads to inconsistent results. See McFadden, The Balancing Test, 29 B.C.L. REv.
585, 643 (1988) (stating that "[w]hen the judge weighs the elements to be balanced, the weights
will be assigned in accordance with the judge's view of what is important. Whether one inter-
est or set of interests 'outweighs' another... depends on which of them the judge values more
highly").
107. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136.
108. Specifically, the Court stated:
While the Commission's actions in denying applications to construct an office build-
ing in excess of 50 stories above the Terminal may indicate that it will refuse to issue
a certificate of appropriateness for any comparably sized structure, nothing the Com-
mission has said or done suggests an intention to prohibit any construction above the
Terminal.
Id. 136-37 (emphasis in original).
109. Indeed, the Court appears to have combined the economic impact prong with the
investment-backed expectations prong. See ia at 136.
110. Compare Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 715 (1987) (where the investment-backed
expectations test was not dispositive concerning whether a taking occurred) with Ruckelshaus
v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (where the Court held that a taking had not occurred by
relying solely on the investment-backed expectations test); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (apparently viewing the economic impact
of the law as irrelevant, and stating that "'the character of the government action' not only is
an important factor in resolving whether the action works a taking but also is determinative").
Id at 426.
111. See Lawrence, supra note 56, at 238.
112. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127 (citing Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188
(1928)); ef Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (where the Court cited Nectow
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factors. Consequently, whether a plaintiff must satisfy both requirements to
demonstrate a taking is unclear.
131
Taken together, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City 1 32 and
Agins v. City of Tiburon 133 indicate the difficulty aggrieved landowners face
in successfully challenging intrusive regulations. The Court deferred to the
legislature in both cases,134 and, therefore, the Court employed a deferential
standard to review land use regulations. Less than ten years later, however,
the Supreme Court abandoned its respectful approach and, as in Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,135 returned to closely scrutinizing land
regulations. '
36
B. An Intensified Standard of Review
In a series of cases decided in the 1986-1987 term,' 37 the Supreme Court
significantly departed from previous case law and suggested that it was im-
posing a higher standard of review for evaluating regulatory taking
claims.
138
131. Prior to Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987), the
Supreme Court did not apply the first prong of the two part Agins test. See, eg., Williamson
County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 191 (1985) (where the
Court failed to address the substantial advancement prong of the Agins test); Kirby Forest
Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 14 (1984) (where the Court noted in dicta that a
taking occurs where a zoning ordinance deprives a landowner of economically viable use of his
land); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 295-96 (1981)
(where the Court applied only the economic viability prong of the Agins test in a case challeng-
ing the facial validity of a law). In contrast, at least one federal court has applied the legiti-
mate state interest test. See Pompa Constr. Corp. v. City of Saratoga Springs, 706 F.2d 418,
422-23 (2d Cir. 1983) (applying both prongs of the Agins test). Under the economic viability
prong, a taking will be found when a regulation denies an owner of all economic use of his
property. See supra notes 116-31. See generally Peterson, supra note 4, at 1327-33 (analyzing
the.two part Agins test); Note, Agins v. City of Tiburon: Open Space Zoning Prevails-Failure
to Siu6mit M-ster Ptan Prevents a Cognizable Decrease in Property Value, 8 PEPPERDINE-L.
REV. 839 (same); Note, Filling in the Pennsylvania Coal Mine: Agins v. City of Tiburon and
Supreme Court Approval of Open Space Zoning, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 790 (same).
132. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
133. 447 U.S. 255 (1979).
134. See supra, text accompanying notes 111, 127.
135. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
136. See infra note 137.
137. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evangel-
ical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Hodel v. Irving, 481
U.S. 704 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
138. In First English, 482 U.S. at 310-11, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that regulatory
takings claims are based on the fifth amendment's just compensation clause, rather than on the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause. In prior regulatory takings cases, it was unclear
which amendment supported the Court's holdings. E.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 119 (1978). Thus, one commentator maintains that because the First Eng-
lish decision was based only on the fifth amendment, the Nollan Court was "free to argue that
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1. Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis:
Pennsylvania Coal Revisited
Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis'39 presented the
Supreme Court with a situation closely analogous to Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon " However, the results of the two cases differ. Like the mining
company in Pennsylvania Coal, Keystone Bituminous Coal Association
(Keystone) challenged the validity of a statute that prohibited mining coal
where its extraction would cause the subsidence of houses and other build-
ings. 14 1 Keystone, however, did not allege that the impact of the statute
effected a taking. 42 Instead, it maintained that the statute was facially
invalid.143
The Supreme Court first applied the character of the governmental action
test developed in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City. 144 The
Court acknowledged that the statute furthered an important public interest,
namely, preventing the subsidence of houses and other similar structures.
1 45
the standards for review of takings challenges may be quite different from those applied in the
due process and equal protection context." Lawrence, supra note 56, at 253 (footnote omitted).
In response to the Nollan decision, one author argues that regulatory takings challenges should
be based on the fourteenth amendment's due process clause to promote judicial deference. See
Shepard, Land Use Regulation in the Rehnquist Court: The Fifth Amendment and Judicial
Intervention, 38 CATH. U.L. REv. 847, 847 (1989).
139. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
140. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
141. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 478. The Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation
Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1406.4 (Purdon Supp. 1990) (hereinafter the Subsidence Act),
prohibits mining coal "so as to cause damage as a result of the caving-in, collapse or subsi-
dence of... [public buildings, houses and cemeteries]."
142. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 493-94.
143. Id The Supreme Court stated:
The posture of the case is critical because we have recognized an important distinc-
tion between a claim that the mere enactment of a statute constitutes a taking and a
claim that the particular impact of a government action on a specific piece of prop-
erty requires the payment of just compensation.
Id at 494.
144. Id. at 485 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978)); see supra notes 84-114 and accompanying text.
145. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485-86. The Keystone Court, however, did not overrule Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Rather, the Keystone Court differentiated
the statutes at issue in the two cases, reasoning that the Subsidence Act "[did] not merely
involve a balancing of private economic interests of coal companies against the private interests
of the surface owners." Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485. Unlike the statute in Pennsylvania Coal,
the Court reasoned that the Subsidence Act promoted the public safety. Id at 488. Further,
the Court distinguished Pennsylvania Coal by stating that the regulation in that case primarily
served private interests. Id. at 486-88. In Pennsylvania Coal, however, Justice Holmes ac-
knowledged that the regulation furthered the public interest. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at
416.
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In particular, the Court deferred to the legislature's finding that the statute
provided for "the conservation of surface land areas"' 6 that removal of the
coal would otherwise damage.'4 7 The Court ruled that even though the en-
forcement of the law would have required it to leave twenty-seven million
tons of coal in the ground, the twenty-seven million tons comprised only two
percent of Keystone's property.
1 4
Next, Keystone argued that the statute rendered its support estate'49 de-
void of value and was a taking requiring compensation.' 50 The Supreme
Court rejected that argument. The Court reasoned that "'where an owner
possesses a full "bundle" of property rights, the destruction of one "strand"
of the bundle is not a taking because the aggregate must be viewed in its
entirety.' "151 The support estate is recognized as a distinct estate in land.
Nonetheless, the Court found that the support estate is not a separate seg-
ment of property. 152 Thus, the Court concluded that the support estate had
value insofar as it augmented the value of either the mineral or surface
estate. '
53
Accordingly, the Court held that the limit on mining was not a taking
because Keystone did not show that the law denied Keystone all economi-
cally viable use of the property. 154 Because Keystone attacked the facial
validity of the statute, the Court did not determine at what point diminution
146. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485 (quoting the Subsidence Act § 1406.2).
147. Id at 486.
148. Id at 496.
149. In Pennsylvania there are three estates in land: the mineral estate, the support estate,
and the surface estate. See id at 478; see also Montgomery, The Development of the Right of
Subjacent Support and the "Third Estate" in Pennsylvania, 25 TEMP. L.Q. 1 (1951). An owner
of land in Pennsylvania "is entitled to the absolute support of his land in its natural state." Id
at 1. Thus, the support estate lies beneath the surface estate. The landowner is free, however,
to contract away his right to subjacent support. Id In that respect, all three estates in land
are severable from one another.
150. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497.
151. Id. at 497 (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979)). The concept of
property as a bundle of rights is widely accepted. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 717
(1987) (holding that the ability to devise and descend property are important property rights,
and a complete abrogation of those rights constitutes a taking); Pruneyard Shopping Center v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 (1980) (noting that "one of the essential sticks in the bundle of prop-
erty rights is the right to exclude others"); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80
(1979) ("we hold that the 'right to exclude,' so universally held to be a fundamental element of
the property right, falls within this category of interests that the Government cannot take
without compensation") (footnote omitted). See generally Comment, supra note 78, at 693-
713 (providing an excellent analysis of the Court's bundle of rights concept).
152. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 501.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 499; see Lawrence, supra note 56, at 250-51 (arguing that the Court introduced
a higher, non-deferential standard of review in Keystone because it examined the purposes
underlying the Subsidence Act).
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in value rises to the level of a taking. The Court's opinion, however, clearly
indicates that de minimis losses are not takings.1 55
Although the Court deferred to the legislature, the Court adopted a higher
standard of review by analyzing the effectiveness of the statute.' 56 As Chief
Justice Rehnquist noted in dissent, the majority should have followed prece-
dent and maintained a deferential standard of review.' 57 In other words,
according to the Chief Justice, the Court should have inquired only into
whether the legislature could have rationally believed that the statute met its
stated aims. 58 By analyzing the means of the statute, however, the Court
adopted a nondeferential standard of review.' 59
2. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission: The Nexus Test
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 1 Justice Scalia, writing for
the majority, breathed new life into the first prong of the two part inquiry set
forth in Agins v. City of Tiburon. 6 In Nollan, the Court held that unless a
regulation substantially advanced a legitimate state interest, regardless of the
level of intrusion, the regulation would constitute a taking.'62
The Nollans, owners of a beachfront lot in California, applied for a coastal
permit pursuant to the California Coastal Act, 163 authorizing them to re-
155. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 498-99 (2% loss of property not a taking); cf Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding a regulation that reduced the value of a
landowner's property by 75% against a takings challenge); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S.
394 (1915) (rejecting a takings claim where a regulation reduced the value of a landowner's
property from $800,000 to $60,000).
156. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 511 n.3 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
157. Id.
158. As Chief Justice Rehnquist stated, "'whether in fact the provisions will accomplish
the objectives is not the question: the [constitutional requirement] is satisfied if ... the..
[State] Legislature rationally could have believed that the [Act] would promote its objective.'"
Id. (emphasis in original) (alterations in original) (quoting Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff,
467 U.S. 229, 242 (1984)). See generally Clarke, supra note 79 (discussing the Keystone deci-
sion); Comment, Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis: Toward Redefining
Takings Law, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 877 (1988) (same).
159. See supra text accompanying notes 84-131.
160. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
161. 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (holding that a regulation constitutes a taking if it does not
substantially advance a legitimate state interest or if it denies landowners economic use of the
property).
162. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834. The Court noted that prior to Nollan, "[o]ur cases have not
elaborated on the standards for determining what constitutes a 'legitimate state interest' or
what type of connection between the regulation and the state interest satisfies the requirement
that the former 'substantially advance' the latter." Id
163. See CAL. PuB. Ras. CODE §§ 30,000-30,900 (Deering 1986). Section 30,212 of the
California Coastal Act ensures
[p]ubic access from the nearest public roadway to the shoreline and along the coast
shall be provided in new development projects .... Dedicated accessway shall not be
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place an existing bungalow with a three bedroom house.' The California
Coastal Commission (California Commission) issued the permit, 65 condi-
tioned upon the Nollans granting to the public an easement across their
property. ' 66 The California Commission maintained that the condition en-
sured the public's continued lateral access to the beach as well as its view of
the beach. 67 The Nollans countered that the condition amounted to a tak-
ing of their property because it resulted in an uncompensated physical ap-
propriation of a portion of their land.1
61
Justice Scalia stated that if an easement were imposed unilaterally, then a
taking clearly would have occurred. 69  The Court reasoned that a land-
owner has a right to exclude others from his property and characterized an
easement as a permanent physical occupation infringing on that right.' 70 In
other words, the imposition of an easement would have been a taking per
se. 7 ' Next, Justice Scalia found that the condition, unlike the direct imposi-
tion of an easement, would have been valid if two requirements were met.
First, the California Commission must have the authority to deny the devel-
opment permit.' 72 Second, the condition imposed must advance the same
purpose that the denial of the permit would have furthered.'
73
required to be opened to public use until a public agency or private association agrees
to accept responsibility for maintenance and liability of the accessway.
Id. at § 30,212.
164. 483 U.S. at 828.
165. Id
166. Id.
167. Id. The California Costal Commission (California Commission) reasoned that the
easement would increase the public's access to the beach because a county park was located
close to the Nollan's property. Id.
168. Id. at 829.
169. Id. at 831. Justice Scalia characterized the imposition of an easement as a permanent
physical occupation for which compensation would have been warranted. Id. at 832; see also
supra note 99 (discussing the physical invasion test enunciated in Loretto). Under prior case
law, the appropriation of an easement constitutes a taking. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164 (1979); United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624 (1961).
170. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987).
171. Id. at 831; see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)
(holding that a permanent physical occupation by the government constitutes a taking); see
also Michelman, supra note 3, at 1608 (noting that Nollan "seems most satisfactorily under-
stood as a further manifestation, albeit in somewhat surprising form, of the talismanic force of
'permanent physical occupation' in takings adjudication").
172. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836. If the authority to deny a permit is within the California
Commission's police powers, then the denial would not effect a taking. Id In dissent, Justice
Brennan noted that the California Commission could have constitutionally denied the permit
without effecting a taking because the property would have had remaining economic uses. Id
at 844-45 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
173. Id at 836-37 ("If a prohibition designed to accomplish that purpose would be a legiti-
mate exercise of the police power rather than a taking, it would be strange to conclude that
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Addressing the first requirement, Justice Scalia stated that the California
Commission could deny the permit if the proposed house created a "psycho-
logical barrier" that dissuaded people from using the beach.174 Thus, denial
of the permit to increase the public's view of the beach would have been
within the California Commission's police powers."7 5 Accordingly, requir-
ing the Noilans to provide a viewing spot on their property which would
allow the public to see the beach would have been constitutional.""'
Analyzing the second requirement, the Court found a fatal flaw in the
California Commission's order. The Court ruled that there was a weak
nexus between the lateral access condition and the purposes underlying the
development restrictions.' 77 Justice Scalia reasoned that the condition
would only benefit people already on the beach-it would not increase the
public's view of the beach.'"" Accordingly, Justice Scalia's opinion con-
cluded that the purpose of the condition was to obtain an uncompensated
easement. 179 As a result, the Supreme Court held that the lateral access
condition was invalid.' 80
Prior to Nollan, the appropriate standard of review of a state's exercise of
police power was whether the action was reasonably related to the purported
state interest. 18' Under that standard of review, the Nollan Court should
providing the owner an alternative to that prohibition which accomplishes the same purposes
is not.").
174. Id at 835-36. The development of houses along the shore may have created the ap-
pearance that the beach was private, thereby dissuading public use. See id. at 849 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
175. Id at 835-36.
176. Id at 836. Alternatively, the California Commission could have required a height
limitation, a width restriction or a ban on fences, and remained within constitutional bounds.
Id
177. Id. at 837.
178. Id at 838.
179. Id at 837.
180. Id. at 839.
181. See Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242-43 (1984) (stating that
"[w]hen the legislature's purpose is legitimate and its means are not irrational, our cases make
clear that empirical debates over the wisdom of takings-no less than debates over the wisdom
of other kinds of socioeconomic legislation--are not to be carried out in the federal courts");
Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61. 68 (1981) (concluding that a zoning ordinance is not a
taking "if it is rationally related to legitimate state concerns and does not deprive the owner of
economically viable use of his property"); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 514
(1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that "[w]ith one minor exception, between [1928 and
1974], this Court did not review the substance of any zoning ordinances"); Goldblatt v. Town
of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 595 (1962) (courts should not substitute their judgment concern-
ing the efficacy of a statute for that of a legislative body); see also Nollan, 483 U.S. at 843
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[i]t is also by now commonplace that this Court's review of the
rationality of a State's exercise of its police power demands only that the State 'could rationally
have decided' that the measure adopted might achieve the State's objective") (emphasis in
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not have found that the condition constituted a taking because the condi-
tional easement would have provided more public access to the beach.'8 2
Nonetheless, by refusing to defer to the California Commission's findings
that the conditional easement preserved the public's lateral access to the
beach, the Supreme Court implicitly prescribed a higher, intermediate stan-
dard of review.' 83 Consequently, courts must now scrutinize the degree to
which a regulation advances the purposes underlying it.'" 4 This was the
state of takings law when the United States Claims Court decided Loveladies
Harbor, Inc. v. United States.
II. LOVELADIES HARBOR, INC V. UNITED STATES
In Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States (Loveladies),t s ' Loveladies
purchased 250 acres of property along the New Jersey Shore for the purpose
of constructing residential homes.' 6 The property included wetlands which
Loveladies had to fill to develop the site.'8 7 To begin development, Lovela-
dies applied for a permit to fill and develop twelve and one-half acres of
wetlands. The Corps denied the permit, reasoning that the intended con-
struction would harm the wetlands.'88 Accordingly, Loveladies filed suit in
the United States Claims Court, alleging that the denied permit constituted a
taking under the fifth amendment.' 8 9 In 1988, both parties filed summary
judgment motions which the court denied. Nearly two years later, a trial
was held on the merits.1 90
original) (quoting Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981)); cf id. at
835 n.3 (stating that "there is no reason to believe... that so long as the regulation of property
is at issue the standards for takings challenges, due process challenges, and equal protection
challenges are identical"). See generally Michelman, supra note 3, at 1607 (concluding that
prior to Nollan the Court employed a deferential standard of review).
182. 483 U.S. at 847 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
183. See generally Michelman, supra note 3, at 1607-08 (stating that the "[Nollan] Court
expressly endorsed a form of semi-strict or heightened judicial scrutiny of regulatory means-
ends relationships").
184. See, e.g., Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 21 CI. Ct. 161 (1990) (where the
Claims Court found that the denial of a fill permit was a taking because of the minimal connec-
tion between the protection of the wetlands and the ban on mining); see also Marzulla &
Marzulla, supra note 19, at 558-60 (discussing Florida Rock).
185. 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990).
186. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 C1. Ct. 381, 383 (1988).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 384.
189. Id. at 383.
190. Loveladies Harbor Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990).
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A. Some Preliminary Questions
In Loveladies Harbor, the Claims Court denied the parties' motions for
summary judgment because there were material facts in dispute concerning
the remaining uses of Loveladies' property. 191 Hence, the court did not hold
that the denial of the section 404 permit constituted a taking.192 Neverthe-
less, when denying the government's claim that a taking had not occurred as
a matter of law, the court evaluated the merits of the takings claim. 193 As a
preliminary matter, Chief Judge Smith stated that a taking can occur in two
ways. First, a taking can result when a regulation fails to substantially ad-
vance a legitimate state interest.194 Second, a taking can occur when a gov-
ernmental regulation deprives an owner's land of all economic value.
195
The court first addressed the substantial advancement test 96 created in
Agins v. City of Tiburon.197 The Claims Court departed from prior case law
which held that a regulation constitutes a taking if it does not substantially
advance a legitimate state interest or if it denies a landowner economic use of
his property.' 98 The court instead applied a two part test.' 99 First, the
court examined whether the regulation promoted either the public welfare or
a private interest.2 'o Next, the court balanced the "intended public benefit
191. Loveladies Harbor, 15 Cl. Ct. at 396-398. Before evaluating the takings claim, the
Claims Court first addressed the jurisdictional issue of ripeness raised by the defendant. Id at
385-86. Under the doctrine of ripeness, there must be an actual controversy before a court,
and the controversy must be one which affects the legal interests of the parties. See, e.g., Lake
Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 506-08 (1972) (discussing ripeness doctrine);
United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89 (1947) (same); Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941) (same). See generally R. ROTUNDA, J. No-
WAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2.13(d) (1986) (same). In the context of takings, a claim is not ripe "where the private
litigant never submitted a plan or application for development to the governing body whose
approval was required." Loveladies Harbor, 15 Cl. Ct. at 385. Even though Loveladies did not
submit an alternative plan, the Claims Court held that the claim was ripe. Id. at 387. The
court reasoned that Loveladies' submission of a less intensive proposal for developing fewer
than 12.5 acres would be futile because the Corps would probably deny the alternative propo-
sal as well. Id. at 386-87.
192. Loveladies Harbor, 15 Cl. Ct. at 398.
193. Id at 387-93.
194. Id at 387 (citing Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485
(1987)).
195. Id.
196. This test examines whether a regulation substantially advances a legitimate state inter-
est. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
197. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
198. See supra notes 116-31 and accompanying text (discussing the two part Agins inquiry).
199. Loveladies Harbor, 15 C1. Ct. at 388.
200. Id.
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against the harm inflicted upon the landowner involved."' ' Resolution of
the latter part of the test became the crucial issue in Loveladies.20°
The Claims Court acknowledged that the fill permit requirement fur-
thered the public welfare because it preserved wetlands.2 "3 The court found,
however, that because Loveladies was unable to obtain a fill permit, the
value of its property severely depreciated. 2° Consequently, because Lovela-
dies' property had virtually no remaining economic use, the court ruled that
the harm to Loveladies outweighed the public benefit of the regulation2
Nevertheless, the court did not rely on the first prong alone.'o° Instead,
the court held that "no court has ever found that a taking has occurred
solely because a legitimate state interest was not substantially advanced. ' 20 7
Thus, the Claims Court viewed the "lack of a legitimate state interest in this
case"2 0 8 as one factor among many to consider.2 t°
Next, the court analyzed the extent to which the wetlands diminished in
value and questioned whether the property had any remaining economic
use.2t0 By comparing the preregulation fair market value of the property to
its postregulation fair market value, the court concluded that the property
diminished in value by ninety-eight percent.2 1 ' Citing a series of Supreme
Court cases holding that reduction in value by itself does not require com-
pensation,2 12 the Claims Court reiterated that a diminution in value alone
201. Id.
202. See infra text acompanying notes 247-65.
203. Loveladies Harbor, 15 Cl. Ct. at 388.
204. Loveladies estimated that the value of its property depreciated from $3,790,000 to
$13,725.50 as a result of not obtaining a fill permit. Id.
205. Id. at 389. Only one other case stands for this proposition. See Florida Rock Indus.,
Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987); see also
infra note 219 (summarizing the Claims Court's disposition of Florida Rock).
206. Loveladies Harbor, 15 Cl. Ct. at 389.
207. Id. at 390 (footnote omitted). Another reason why the Claims Court did not hold that
a taking occurred-even though it found that the harm suffered by the plaintiff outweighs the
public interest-was due to the ambiguous nature of balancing public and private interests. Id.
at 389; see also Florida Rock, 791 F.2d at 904 (illustrating this ambiguity). As the Claims
Court related, Florida Rock "found the balance in favor of the landowner I ecause the Clean
Water Act's preservation of wetlands was not for the prevention of a public harm but rather
for the maintenance of a public benefit." Loveladies Harbor, 15 Cl. Ct. at 388. That distinc-
tion, however, is unclear because determining whether the Government is promoting a public
benefit or preventing a public harm is often difficult. Id. at 389.
208. Loveladies Harbor, 15 Cl. Ct. at 390.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 390-93.
211. Id. at 394.
212. Eg., Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1984); Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,
369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926); Hadacheck
v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405 (1915).
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does not constitute a taking.2 13 According to the court, a landowner must
show that the government action deprived him of all economic use of the
property.214 Because Loveladies' property could neither be developed nor
used for recreational purposes, the court concluded that the property had no
remaining economic use. 215 Accordingly, as a matter of law, the court de-
nied the defendant's motion for summary judgment.2"6 Additionally, the
Claims Court denied Loveladies' cross-motion for summary judgment 217 be-
cause material facts remained in dispute concerning the remaining usefulness
of the twelve and one-half acres of wetlands and whether the property had
any remaining economic value.218
B. Compensation Required
Nearly two years after the Claims Court denied the parties' motions for
summary judgment, Chief Judge Smith, writing for the court, held that the
denial of the fill permit constituted a taking under the fifth amendment. 219
213. Loveladies Harbor, 15 Cl. Ct. at 398; see also Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979).
214. Loveladies Harbor, 15 Cl. Ct. at 394.
215. Id. at 395.
216. Id at 396.
217. Id. at 398
218. The parties contested the value remaining in the Loveladies' land after the permit
denial. Id. at 397. The government contended that the one acre of upland could be used for
residential development. Id. It also contended that the 11.5 acres of wetlands could be used
"as a lagoon access to and from the one acre of uplands [sic]" Id, (footnote omitted). By
contrast, the plaintiff alleged that the property had absolutely no remaining value. Id.
219. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 160 (1990). On the same day
the Claims Court issued Loveladies, the Claims Court decided a companion case holding that
refusal to grant a permit constituted a taking. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 21
Cl. Ct. 161 (1990). Like the plaintiff in Loveladies, Florida Rock sued the United States, alleg-
ing that the denial of a fill permit constituted a taking under the fifth amendment. Id. at 164.
On remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, see Florida Rock
Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986), the United States Claims Court
first considered whether the proposed activity, the mining of limestone, fell within the public
nuisance exception to the fifth amendment. Finding that the activity would not endanger the
environment, the court concluded that the nuisance exception was inapplicable. Florida Rock,
21 Cl. Ct. at 167; Cf Loveladies, 21 Cl. Ct. at 154 n.3 (public nuisance exception inapplicable);
see supra note 78 (discussing the public nuisance exception). Next, the court compared the
preregulation value of the plaintiff's property with its postregulation value to determine
whether a taking occurred. Florida Rock, 21 Cl. Ct. at 168. The court found that the denial of
the permit substantially reduced the value of the plaintiff's property, and it severely impinged
on the plaintiff's investment-backed expectations. Id. at 175-76. Accordingly, the Claims
Court awarded the plaintiff damages totalling a little over $1,000,000 to compensate the tak-
ing. Id at 176.
Prior to Loveladies and Florida Rock the Claims Court never awarded compensation to a
landowner who was denied a fill permit. But see Formanek v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 785
(1989) (suggesting that the denial of a fill permit constitutes a taking); Beur6-Co. v. United
States, 16 Cl. Ct. 42 (1988) (same). Thus, when viewed together, Loveladies and Florida Rock
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1. Nuisance Exception is Inapplicable
Throughout the course of the Loveladies litigation, the government main-
tained that filling the wetlands fell within the public nuisance exception to
the fifth amendment, thus, precluding the finding of a taking.' ° The Gov-
ernment inferred that the proposed activity constituted a public nuisance
because the Corps denied the permit to prevent harm to the wetlands."I
The Claims Court rejected that argument.222 Instead, the court deferred to
the DEP finding that the proposed activity would not adversely affect the
quality of New Jersey's waters.223 Therefore, the state's pollution findings
effectively preempted the Corps' determination that the filling of wetlands
should be prohibited as a nuisance.'24
2. Economic Impact
To determine whether a taking occurred, the Claims Court relied on the
test created in Agins v. City of Tiburon.225 In Agins the Court held that a
suggest that the parameters of inverse condemnation have expanded. For a thorough discus-
sion of the Federal Circuit's earlier opinion in Florida Rock, see Note, Florida Rock Indus-
tries, Inc. v. United States, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 999 (1987).
In a case similar to Loveladies Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1188 (Ct. Cl.
1981), Deltona Corporation (Deltona) was denied a permit to fill and develop wetlands. Con-
sequently, Deltona sued the government, maintaining that the denial of the permit rendered its
property devoid of all economic use. Id. at 1191. Alternatively, Deltona argued that the de-
nial of the permit deprived the land of its highest and best economic use. The government
contended that the property did have remaining economic uses, and that Deltona's alternative
argument had no legal basis. Id
After declaring that diminution in value by itself does not constitute a taking, see id, the
Deltona court applied the two part test created in Agins. Unlike the Loveladies court, the court
in Deltona first held that the wetland regulations substantially advanced legitimate interests.
Id at 1192. The court, however, failed to explain why the regulations advance legitimate
interests, stating: "we take as given that (the regulations]... substantially advance legitimate
and important federal interests." Id Next the court found that the property had remaining
economic uses, noting that Deltona could still develop I 1 acres of uplands. Id Moreover, the
court rejected Deltona's contention that the permit denial effected a taking because it deprived
Deltona of the highest and best use of its property. The court reasoned that this argument was
simply another way of saying that the property had dimininished in value, a proposition insuf-
ficient to warrant compensation. Id at 1193.
220. See Loveladies, 21 Cl. Ct. at 154 n.3; Loveladies Harbor, 15 Cl. Ct. at 388-90, see also
supra note 78 (discussing the public nuisance exception).
221. Loveladie 21 Cl. Ct. at 154 & n.3.
222. Id. at 154 n.3.
223. lI In reaching his decision, Chief Judge Smith stated that because land use regula-
tion is within a state's police powers, "it is reasonable to defer to the state's findings concerning
pollution, and to read the Corps' findings as a permissible exercise of their jurisdiction over
federally-regulated wetlands." Id
224. Despite DEP's findings, the Claims Court concluded that the proposed filling of wet-
lands would not constitute a public nuisance. Id
225. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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regulation effects a taking "if it does not substantially advance legitimate
state interests, or if it 'denies an owner economically viable use of his
land.' "226 As to the first requirement, the court reiterated that a lack of a
legitimate state interest was only one factor among others to consider.227 As
to the second requirement, the court considered the regulation's economic
impact, the degree of interference with the property owner's investment-
backed expectations, as well as the character of the governmental action.2 28
While the Claims Court addressed the economic impact factor by comparing
the preregulation value of the wetlands to its postregulation value, 229 it vir-
tually ignored the latter two factors.23°
3. Preregulation and Postregulation Value
Loveladies contended that in the absence of the fill permit requirement,
"the highest and best use" 231 of its property would have been for a forty-lot
residential development.232 The Claims Court accepted Loveladies' conten-
tion 233 because its proposal would have been "physically possible and finan-
cially feasible" 234 and because the government was unable to suggest an
alternative "highest and best use."'235 Accordingly, the fair market value of
the property totalled $2,658,000, representing the sales price of the proposed
forty houses. 236 By contrast, in the absence of a fill permit the highest and
best use of Loveladies' property was for recreation and conservation, with a
corresponding fair market value of $12,500.237
226. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260 (citations omitted).
227. Loveladies, 21 Cl. Ct. at 155.
228. Id. (citing Connolly v. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986)).
229. Id.
230. Although the Claims Court listed three factors to consider, the court explicitly ac-
knowledged that its analysis did not consider the character of the government action or the
effect of the regulation on the plaintiffs' investment-backed expectations. Id. at 160 n.9.
Rather than applying all the factors, the court declared that the three factors are merely guide-
lines to aid in determining whether a taking occurred, and are not dispositive of the issue. Id.
231. The "highest and best use" of property is defined as " '[t]he reasonably probable and
legal use of vacant land or an improved property, which is physically possible, appropriately
supported, financially feasible, and that results in the highest value.' " Id. at 156 (quoting
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS, THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE 19
(9th ed. 1987)).
232. Id. The plaintiffs based this contention on an appraisal that their expert witness per-
formed. See id.
233. Id. at 157.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 156.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 158-59. The Corps continuously maintained that a taking had not occurred
because the plaintiff did not apply for a permit to fill less than 12.5 acres. Thus, the Corps
reasoned that the property had remaining economic uses. Id. at 157. Nevertheless, the Claims
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Even though the Claims Court recognized that more than mere diminu-
tion in value is required to prove a taking,238 it held that a taking had oc-
curred.239 The holding was based on the "drastic economic impact on the
plaintiffs' property, coupled with the court's earlier determination of a lack
of a countervailing substantial legitimate state interest.",240 Thus, the Claims
Court awarded to Loveladies $2,659,000 plus interest as just compensa-
tion.24 ' The court's ultimate decision rested on the lack of a legitimate state
interest in denying the fill permit, as well as the severe effect that the permit
denial had on the value of the plaintiffs' property.
III. TOWARD A HIGHER STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. The Wrong Road to the Right Place
1. The Right Place
Given the drastic impact that the permit denial had on the value of Love-
ladies' property, the Claims Court's result comports with the fairness goals
of takings jurisprudence.2 42 Loveladies purchased its property for the pur-
pose of constructing residential homes before the wetland regulations were
enacted.2 43 Hence, the denied permit severely impaired Loveladies' invest-
ment-backed expectations. At the time that Loveladies purchased the prop-
erty, Loveladies could not have foreseen that a future regulation would
interfere with its development plans. 2" Therefore, the finding of a taking
was consistent with Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.245
Moreover, the conclusion reached in Loveladies accords with the economic
use prong of the test created in Agins v. City of Tiburon.2" The permit de-
nial did not merely diminish the value of Loveladies' property, it stripped
the property of all economic value. Accordingly, Loveladies should have
been compensated.
Court rejected that argument, finding that it would have been futile for the plaintiffs to have
applied for another permit because the Corps had denied similar permits in the past. Id.
238. The Claims Court estimated that the plaintiff's property diminished in value by over
99%. Id. at 160.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 161.
242. See supra note 65.
243. Loveladies, 21 Cl. Ct. at 153.
244. One commentator suggests that foreseeability is the standard for determining whether
a regulation interferes with a landowner's expectations. Peterson, supra note 4, at 1320.
245. See supra note 84-114.
246. See supra notes 115-31.
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2 The Wrong Road
The result reached in Loveladies is sound but the Claims Court's reason-
ing deviated from Supreme Court precedent. For example, by comparing
the public's interest in preserving wetlands with Loveladies' interest in devel-
oping its property,247 the Claims Court determined that a legitimate state
interest was lacking.24 To reach that conclusion, the court relied on Agins
v. City of Tiburon. 249 A careful reading of Agins, however, indicates that the
Claims Court's reliance was misplaced.25° The Agins Court recognized that
"no precise rule determines when property has been taken," and that the
analysis of a takings claim required a balancing of private and public inter-
ests.251 However, the balancing of public and private interests under the first
prong of Agins does not bear on whether a legitimate state interest was sub-
stantially advanced.25 2 Rather, the appropriate inquiry to determine the le-
gitimacy of a state action requires an examination of the degree to which the
regulation advances the underlying state interest.253 If the regulation is sub-
247. See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 CI. Ct. 381, 388-90 (1988).
248. Id. at 390.
249. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
250. By balancing public and private interests, the Claims Court improperly applied the
substantial advancement test set forth in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
One reason the court balanced competing interests, rather than focusing solely on the eco-
nomic impact of the permit denial, may have been because the court was concerned with
promoting economic efficiency. See A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION To LAW AND ECo-
NOMICS 12 (1983) (one goal of efficiency is to find the least-cost solution to a problem). After
all, cost-benefit analysis is a fundamental method for determining whether an outcome is effi-
cient. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977); J. SENECA & M. TAUS-
SIG, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS (1974).
The ideal approach to awarding compensation to aggrieved landowners combines a land-
owner's expectations with principles of economic efficiency. Under current takings law, a
landowner whose property is taken is awarded the fair market value of the property's highest
and best use. See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506 (1979); Danforth v.
United States, 308 U.S. 271, 283 (1939); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct.
153, 156 (1990). If awarding compensation were based on efficiency, the amount of any exter-
nal costs, such as pollution, would probably reduce the fair market value. Therefore, in addi-
tion to internalizing external costs, that approach would account for a landowner's
expectations. As a result, an aggrieved landowner would not be entitled to compensation for
any harm the landowner caused to the environment. Thus, the Loveladies court should not
have awarded Loveladies' the full fair market value of the property as just compensation, but
should have offset the award to reflect the value of the highest and best use of the property less
clean-up costs. If this approach is adopted, the compensation landowners receive would reflect
their expectations, and the damages that the government pays would be substantially reduced.
See generally Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE LJ. 149, 155-60
(1971) (suggesting that an efficient system of compensation would internalize external costs).
251. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980).
252. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1986) (where the Court
applied the legitimate state interest test without balancing public and private interests).
253. Id.
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stantially tailored to the state interest underlying it, a court should not inval-
idate the regulation.
Prior to Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 254 the Supreme Court
employed a deferential standard of review to determine when a regulation
effects a taking.255 By contrast, in Loveladies, the Claims Court's analysis
was far from deferential. In Penn Central, for example, even though the
Supreme Court applied a balancing test, it still deferred to the legislature's
finding that the state action served a valid public purpose to determine the
legitimacy of a law.256 Unlike the Claims Court, the Penn Central Court did
not balance public and private interests. Instead, the Court focused on the
economic harm that the landowner had suffered.257 Similarly, in Agins, the
Supreme Court did not utilize a balancing test to assess whether the zoning
ordinances were valid.25" Further, even following the intermediate level of
scrutiny developed in Nollan, the Claims Court did not employ the proper
standard of review. In Nollan, the Supreme Court required a close nexus
between a regulation and the state interest upon which it is based.259 Again,
the Supreme Court did not balance the state interest against the economic
harm to the landowner.
B. The Right Road to the Right Place
Wisely, the Claims Court did not rest its decision solely on the legitimate
state interest prong of Agins v. City of Tiburon.26 Instead, the Claims Court
only considered the lack of a legitimate state interest in conjunction with the
economic impact of the permit denial. 261 Rather than weighing public and
private interests to determine whether the permit denial advanced a legiti-
mate state interest, the better approach would have conceded a legitimate
governmental objective and focused on the economic impact of the denied
permit. The Agins test was framed in the disjunctive, and, therefore, a tak-
ing can be found if either prong is satisfied.262 Accordingly, because Lovela-
dies was denied virtually all use of its property,263 the Claims Court would
have reached the same result under that approach. By contrast, under the
254. 483 U.S. 825 (1988).
255. See supra note 181.
256. See supra text accompanying note 111.
257. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
258. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 261 (1980) (where the Court deferred to
the legislature's determination that the zoning ordinances furthered legitimate purposes).
259. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 1986).
260. 447 U.S. 255 (1979).
261. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 C1. Ct. 153, 160 (1990).
262. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
263. Loveladies, 21 Cl. Ct. at 160.
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Claims Court's balancing test, if the economic harm to a landowner out-
weighs public interest factors, the court would find that the law does not
substantially advance a legitimate state interest. Thus, if the court were to
rely solely on the legitimate state interest test, a taking could be found based
only on economic harm, without determining whether the property owner's
land was denied economically viable use and without examining whether the
governmental action substantially advances a legitimate state interest.
In view of the closer scrutiny that land use regulations will receive after
Loveladies, an increase in takings litigation filed in the Claims Court will
probably result."' Thus, the higher standard of review adopted in Lovela-
dies, coupled with large damage awards granted to landowners in other tak-
ings cases, 26 should induce an increase in takings litigation in the Claims
Court.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, the United States Claims
Court for the first time awarded nearly $3,000,000 as compensation to a
builder who was denied a permit under section 404 of the Clean Water Act.
Disregarding prior case law, the Claims Court implicitly adopted a higher
standard to review takings claims.
While the result reached in Loveladies was proper, the Claims Court's
reasoning stands on weak ground. Rather than balancing public and private
interests, the Claims Court should have assessed only the economic impact
of the government action. Nevertheless, Loveladies should provide a spring-
board for other wetland owners who were denied economic use of their
property, now enabling them to receive compensation. Moreover, by initiat-
ing a higher standard of review, other courts may strike down other similar
environmental regulations that have the effect of denying a property owner
viable use of property. Thus, Loveladies is likely to prompt an increase in
takings cases filed in the Claims Court.
Seth E. Zuckerman
264. Notably, Executive Order 12,630 may partially negate the effect of Loveladies due to
the takings impact analysis that agencies should undertake prior to regulating land. See supra
note 55.
265. See UNITED STATES CLAIMS COURT, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT (1991) (listing the dam-
ages awarded in takings cases).
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